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GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE: JUDICIAL APPLICA-
TION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
Since its passage in 1967, Florida's Government in the Sunshine
Law' has been well received by the judiciary. The courts have re-
fused to riddle the law with exceptions or otherwise limit the broad
scope of the open meeting principle. Ironically, it is this judicial
deference that has made it necessary to consider the desirability of
limiting the law in some respects;' unbending application in some
cases has brought about harsh results, totally out of proportion to the
benefits derived from strict enforcement of the law.3 This note first
will survey recent judicial developments concerning application of
the Sunshine Law and then will offer suggestions for reform. It is
the contention of this note that certain refinements could improve
the law significantly, without damaging the open meeting principle.
I. APPLICATION OF THE SUNSHINE LAW
A. What Is a Meeting?
The Sunshine Law mandates that all "meetings" of state and
local governing bodies, commissions and authorities must be open
to the public when official actions are contemplated.4 The first at-
tempt by a Florida court to define "meeting" arose under Florida's
earlier open meeting statute. 5 In Turk v. Richard6 the Florida Su-
l. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1973) provides:
(1) All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or authority or
of any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation or any political
subdivision, except as otherwise provided in the constitution, at which official
acts are to be taken are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all
times, and no resolution, rule, regulation or formal action shall be considered
binding except as taken or made at such meeting.
(2) The minutes of a meeting of any such board or commission of any such
state agency or authority shall be promptly recorded and such records shall be
open to public inspection. The circuit courts of this state shall have jurisdiction
to issue injunctions to enforce the purposes of this section upon application by
any citizens of this state.
(3) Any person who is a member of a board or commission or of any state
agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation or any political sub-
division who violates the provisions of this section by attending a meeting not
held in accordance with the provisions hereof is guilty of a misdemeanor of the
second degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082 or § 775.083.
The statute will be referred to herein as the Sunshine Law.
2. See notes 116-37 and accompanying text infra.
3. See notes 138-45 and accompanying text infra.
4. See note 1 supra.
5. FLA. STAT. § 165.22 (1973). In City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So. 2d 38 (Fla.
1971), the Florida Supreme Court held that § 286.011 supersedes and repeals § 165.22,
which nonetheless remains in the statute books.
6. 47 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1950).
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preme Court held that only "formal assemblages" of a governing body
"sitting ... for the transaction of official municipal business" consti-
tute "meetings."' A "formal assemblage" occurred only when a body
met as provided by law, for the purpose of joint consideration, de-
cision and action, since only at such a gathering "could any formal
action be taken . . .that could officially bind [the body]." 8 Whenever
a local body desired "to prevent the public from knowing what action
[was] to be taken or what deliberation [was] taking place, it [gathered]
in an informal session."" Accordingly, the "formal meeting" doctrine
rendered the early open meeting law impotent when officials sought to
insulate their conduct from public scrutiny.0
The Florida courts have refused, however, to invoke the "formal
meeting" doctrine under the 1967 Sunshine Law. In Times Publishing
Co. v. Williams"' the Second District Court of Appeal limited the
holding in Turk to its definition of "meeting" as "a joint assemblage
at which 'formal action' could be taken."'12 Interpreting the new law
to overcome the infirmities of Turk, the court concluded that the
legislature intended to open to public view each step in the decision-
making process leading to "formal action"; each step necessarily was
an "official act" within the meaning of the statute.'3
Within two months of the Times decision, the Florida Supreme
Court reached the same conclusion in Board of Public Instruction v.
Doran.14 Doran involved a routine meeting of a school board held in
executive session every Wednesday before later formal action. The
purpose of the session was to inform and "educate" the board and
staff members about issues to be considered at the formal meeting.
The public and press were refused access to these assemblages since
the board presumably believed that, under Turk, the new law covered
only formal meetings.' 5 The supreme court, however, held that "[t]he
obvious intent was to cover any gathering of the members where the
members deal with some matter on which foreseeable action will be
taken by the board."'"
7. Id. at 544.
8. Id. See also Note, Government in the Sunshine: Promise or Placebo?, 23 U. FLA.
L. REv. 361, 364 (1971).
9. Comment, Access to Governmental Information in California, 54 CAun. L. REv.
1650. 1652 (1966).
10. Note, supra note 8, at 364.
11. 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
12. Id. at 473.
13. Id.
14. 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969).
15. Id. at 696.
16. Id. at 698.
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No further refinement of "foreseeable action" has been provided.
Once it has been determined that formal action might be taken at
some future time, Times and Doran indicate that each stage of the de-
cision-making process, formal or informal, is within the scope of the
Sunshine Law."7
Despite the broad foreseeable action standard established in Doran,
Bassett v. Braddock' held that deliberations and discussions may "take
place beyond the veil of actual 'meetings' of the body involved." 19 The
issue in that case was whether a school board's labor representative
could initiate private preliminary negotiations with the teachers'
representative without violating the open meeting principle. The pre-
liminary discussions between the two representatives were held not
to constitute "meetings, ''2 0 but the court's justification for this con-
clusion appears to contradict prior case law:
Preliminary "discussions" may never result in any action taken.
There may be numerous informal exchanges of ideas and possi-
bilities, either among members or with others (at the coke ma-
chine, in a foyer, etc.) when there is no relationship at all to any
meeting at which any foreseeable action is contemplated.2'
Under the rationale announced in the Doran case, these preliminary
negotiations would seem to constitute an important step in the de-
cision-making process. This apparent contradiction of its prior philoso-
phy may have resulted from the court's belief that its decision was
required by the Florida constitution. The court observed that closed
meetings are necessary to preserve the public employees' constitutional
right to bargain collectively.22
The effect of Bassett on the "foreseeable action" test should be
minimal for at least two reasons. First, the supreme court's holding
can be viewed as the result of a conclusion that protection of a con-
stitutional right outweighs rigid observation of the open meeting
17. Cf. Note, supra note 8, at 367.
18. 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972).




The public should not suffer a handicap at the expense of a purist view of
open public meetings, so long as the ultimate debate and decisions are public
and the "official acts" and "formal action" specified by the statute are taken in
open "public meetings."
Id. at 427. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 6, protects the rights of employees to bargain collec-
tively.
1974)
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principle.23 Secondly, the Florida legislature has altered24 the result in
Bassett by passage of chapter 74-100. 2 5 When collective bargaining
issues are to be discussed, section 3 of that law exempts from the scope
of the Sunshine Law consultations between the chief executive officer
of a public employer and the public employer. The negotiations be-
tween a public employees' representative and a bargaining agent of
the employer, however, are subject to the open meeting requirement.
If this law is applied to facts similar to those in Bassett, discussions re-
garding collective bargaining between the public official in charge
of administering the school system (presumably the superintendent
of schools) and the school board should be exempt from the Sunshine
Law. On the other hand, bargaining between the superintendent and
the teachers' representative would not be exempt from the law. Al-
though it is unclear from the language of the law, discussions between
a professional bargaining agent employed by the school board and the
teachers' representative also should be subject to the open meeting
requirement. Application of the judicially created foreseeable action
test to a situation such as that involved in Bassett also would require
that the negotiations between both sides be open to the public. Thus
this test formulated by the courts appears to comport well with the
intent of the legislature regarding "meetings," as reflected in chapter
74-100.
Furthermore, a recent case emphasizes the continuing vitality of
the foreseeable action test by suggesting that even preliminary stages
in the decision-making process can be considered "meetings." Bigelow
v. Howze26 involved a four-member fact-finding committee, established
23. See 262 So. 2d at 426.
24. Because of the constitutional basis for the holding in Bassett it might appear
that legislative alteration of the decision would be precluded. The supreme court,
however, has consistently refused to implement judicially the collective bargaining
provision of the Florida constitution. The court has sought to preserve the right to
bargain collectively without devising a specific bargaining scheme. At the same time,
the court has urged the legislature to enact appropriate legislation implementing the
constitutional provision. See Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Ryan, 225 So. 2d
903 (Fla. 1969). Likewise in Bassett the court appears to have left open the door for
legislative action in the area by its refusal to provide any specific guidelines. The
court in Bassett was concerned with preserving the right, not implementing it. See
262 So. 2d at 426. Thus legislative implementation does not create a constitutional
conflict. It remains to be decided, however, whether specific implementing legislation
is consistent with the mandate of article I, § 6, of the Florida constitution.
25. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-100, § 3 (§ 447.023), provides in part:
(1) All discussions between the chief executive officer of the public employer
and the legislative body of the public employer relative to collective bargaining
shall be exempt from § 286.011, Florida Statutes.
(2) The collective bargaining negotiations between a chief executive officer
and a bargaining agent shall not be exempt from § 286.011, Florida Statutes.
26. 291 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
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by the Charlotte County Commission, that had traveled to Tennessee
to investigate the qualifications of two firms being considered as
appraisers for a county contract.27 During the course of their travels,
the committee members agreed that they would recommend the con-
tract be awarded to Hunnicutt and Associates, Inc., rather than Howze
and Associates. Upon return to Punta Gorda, the committee met
with Hunnicutt representatives for breakfast, without notifying the
public, to clarify some aspects of their agreement. The Second District
Court of Appeals considered
whether public officials who are delegated fact-finding responsibility
for the purpose of reporting back to the governing body violate the
Sunshine Law when the fact-finders reach conclusions during the
fact-finding process out of the presence of the public or press when
both . . . had advance knowledge of the . . . mission and its
whereabouts. 28
Indicating that a contrary conclusion would open the door to wide-
spread evasion of the objectives of the Sunshine Law, the court stated
that "where the members of the committee who are also members of
the public body make decisions with respect to the committee's
recommendation . . ." discussion must take place in the sunshine. 2
Since a public meeting in Tennessee was not feasible, the two com-
missioners should not have discussed possible recommendations.
"[C]ommittee recommendations are often accepted by public bodies
at face value and with little discussion" and are therefore a crucial part
of the deliberative process.30 Furthermore, the court recognized that
the breakfast meeting in Punta Gorda was merely a continuation of
the committee's deliberations regarding a recommendation. Since that
meeting had been held without proper public notification, it too was
"tainted." 3'
The Bigelow court's analysis seems consistent with Times and Doran.
An informal discussion among members of a public body concerning
foreseeable formal action to be taken by the full body is an important
stage in the decision-making process and therefore should be subject
to the Sunshine Law. The foreseeable action test appears to be very
much alive and applicable to even the most informal of deliberative
27. Id. at 646. The committee was composed of two commissioners from the five-
member county commission, the tax assessor and the county attorney. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 647.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 647-48.
1974]
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processes.3 2 The attitude of the Florida judiciary was clearly expressed
by the supreme court in City of Miami Beach v. Berns.3 3 While stating
that "[i]n this area of regulating, the statute may push beyond de-
batable limits in order to block evasive techniques,"" the court ad-
vised that "[i]f a public official is unable to know whether by any
convening of two or more officials he is violating the law, he should
leave the meeting forthwith." 35
B. What Is a Board or Commission?
The Sunshine Law requires open meetings of "any board or com-
mission of any state agency or authority or of any agency or authority
of any county, municipal corporation or any political subdivision."8
It is clear that formal governing units such as school boards, town and
city councils, zoning appeals boards, county commissions, the State
Board of Regents, and the State Cabinet all come within the scope
of the statute.3 7 Although no case has been decided on the point, the
Attorney General of Florida has advised that the open meeting statute
does not apply to federal agencies operating in Florida. 8
A more perplexing problem arises, however, when a legislatively
created body performs functions judicial in nature. The Florida Su-
preme Court considered this issue in Canney v. Board of Public In-
struction.39 Michael Canney, a student at Gainesville High School,
was suspended from school for violating the dress code when he re-
fused to cut his long hair to a more "conventional" length. When the
school board upheld the suspension Canney requested and was granted
a public hearing on the matter. After Canney's attorney presented
argument in his behalf, the school board reiterated its view that
Canney's hair length violated the code; the board then recessed the
hearing to deliberate privately on the matter.
4 0
In the First District Court of Appeal, Canney asserted that the
school board, a legislatively created body, had violated the Sunshine
32. This conclusion is reinforced by the recent decision in Town of Palm Beach
v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974), in which the supreme court reaffirmed the test
while declaring that a citizens' advisory committee is subject to the Sunshine Law. See
discussion at notes 46-60 and accompanying text infra.
33. 245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971).
34. Id. at 41.
35. Id.
36. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1) (1973).
37. See Note, supra note 8, at 365.
38. 1971 FLA. ATr'Y GEN. Op. 071-191.
39. 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973).
40. Canney v. Board of Pub. Instr., 231 So. 2d 34, 56-37 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1970).
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Law when it recessed the hearing to reach a decision.4 The court of
appeal concluded to the contrary that the secret deliberations held
by the school board were privileged and did not fall within the pur-
view of the statute.4 2 The court reasoned that, since all judicial de-
liberations are exempt from public scrutiny, quasi-judicial adminis-
trative board hearings also are protected at the deliberation stage."'
The Florida Supreme Court perceived the issue in Canney to be
whether, under the separation of powers doctrine, a school board act-
ing in a quasi-judicial capacity is a part of the legislative branch of
government." The court concluded that the county school board is
a legislatively created agency vested with a combination of legislatively
delegated powers. Therefore, the legislature not only could determine
the powers to be exercised and regulate the procedure to be followed in
hearings before the body it had created, but, further, could require
all meetings of that body, at which official actions are taken, to be
open to the public:
The characterization of a decisional-making [sic] process by a
School Board as "quasi-judicial" does not make the body into a
judicial body. A county school board should not be authorized to
avoid the Government in the Sunshine Law by making its own
determination that an act is quasi-judicial. ... The judiciary should
not encroach upon the Legislature's right to require that the ac-
tivities of the School Board be conducted in the "sunshine.' 45
Thus, it appears that if the body in question is legislatively created
its activities are subject to the open meeting requirement, irrespective
of the functions that the body performs.
Another troublesome question involves committees formed by
"boards and commissions." Many town councils and other state
agencies employ committees to investigate and to administer their
activities. Although these committees act only in an advisory capacity,
their deliberations seem to be subject to the Sunshine Law. Town of
Palm Beach v. Gradison" involved a town council's decision to revise
and update the town's zoning ordinances. A professional planning
firm was employed to prepare a comprehensive plan, and an ad hoc
committee comprised of five citizens was appointed to aid the planners.
The purpose of this citizens' committee was to guide the planners "in
41. Id. at 39.
42. Id.
45. Id.
44. 278 So. 2d at 262.
45. Id. at 263-64.
46. 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974).
1974]
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their efforts to assure that the plan produced would be consistent with
the character, image and land-use controls intended by the citizens." 7
The town council intended that the committee function as an arm of
the zoning commission, although the committee had no authority to
bind either the zoning commission or the town council with its
recommendations. The citizens were not experts in the fields of land-
scaping, civil engineering or vocational zoning, nor were they regularly
employed by the town. The committee never met in public, never
gave notice of its meetings, and never recorded its proceedings.48 After
receiving the citizens' recommendations the zoning commission held
five days of public meetings and debate. The zoning commission then
sent its proposals to the town council, which held six days of public
hearings. The town council publicly approved the plan submitted
by the planners and the zoning commission in "essentially the same
form."'49
Certain property owners adversely affected by the zoning plan
filed suit, maintaining that the ordinance had been passed in violation
of the Sunshine Law. The trial court determined that this purely ad-
visory body was not within the scope of the law." The Fourth District
Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the committee was the "alter
ego" of the town council and zoning commission.51 Gatherings of the
committee were covered by the Sunshine Law since committee
recommendations constituted one phase of the subsequent enactment
of the zoning plan by the town council. Therefore, its meetings were
within the foreseeable action test enunciated in Doran.
52
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the invalidation of the com-
prehensive plan "because of the non-public activities of the citizens
planning committee, which committee was established by the Town
Council, active on behalf of the Council in an advisory capacity, and
participated in the formulation of the zoning plan." s Although the
court conceded that the town council had acted in good faith, it stated
47. Id. at 474.
48. Id. at 475.
49. Id.
50. See IDS Properties, Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 279 So. 2d 353, 355 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973). The trial judge concluded that the citizens' committee did
not have the status of a board or commission:
"This committee of citizens, while influential in what the planner ultimately
produced, was merely advisory as far as the planner, the zoning commission and
the town council were concerned. They made no decision which bound either the
zoning commission or the town council."
Id. (quoting from opinion of trial court).
51. Id. at 356.
52. Id. at 357.
53. 296 So. 2d at 478.
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that the policy of public meetings extended to "any committee es-
tablished by the Town Council to act in any type of advisory capaci-
ty."' 54 The citizens' committee in this case was delegated what the court
determined were important zoning functions ordinarily exercised by
the town council itself, elevating the committee to the "status of a
board or commission." 55 The state policy of public access to the de-
cision-making process and the need to preclude evasion of the law
dictated this result.56
Because of the broad language employed by the court in Town of
Palm Beach it is not clear whether advisory bodies lacking powers or
duties must comply with the open meeting requirement. The court
stressed the fact that the delegated powers fell within the foreseeable
action standard.57 It would seem that absent the power to influence
any step in the decision-making process an advisory body should not
be subject to the Sunshine Law. Although it is also unclear at this
point what functions are sufficiently important to elevate an advisory
body to board or commission status, Town of Palm Beach seems to
indicate that a body acting in any advisory capacity will be subject to
the law.58 Additionally, the Town of Palm Beach opinion seems to
encompass the type of advisory committee involved in Bigelow v.
Howze.59 Certainly the presence on the advisory committee of mem-
bers of the public body that had created the committee should make
its delegated powers important enough to require compliance with
the Sunshine Law. The lesson of Town of Palm Beach was well stated
by the court and is equally applicable to all "board or commission"
dilemmas: "The principle to be followed is very simple: When in
doubt, the members of any board, agency, authority or commission
should follow the open-meeting policy of the State."60
C. The Exceptions
Perhaps the major factor distinguishing the Florida open meeting
54. Id. at 476.
55. Id. at 475.
56. Id. at 477, stating:
The statute should be construed so as to frustrate all evasive devices. This can
be accomplished only by embracing the collective inquiry and discussion stages
within the terms of the statute, as long as such inquiry and discussion is con-
ducted by any committee or other authority appointed and established by a
governmental agency, and relates to any matter on which foreseeable action will
be taken.
57. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
58. 296 So. 2d at 476.
59. 291 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974). See notes 26-31 and accompanying
text supra.
60. 296 So. 2d at 477, citing Note, supra note 8, at 365.
1974]
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statute from similar statutes enacted by other states"' is the absence of
express exceptions. The Florida law mandates that all meetings of a
board or commission shall be open to the public "except as otherwise
provided in the constitution." 2 The 1968 Florida constitution appears
to provide few exceptions, and the courts have not been eager to
recognize exceptions for particular governmental bodies under the
law. In Board of Public Instruction v. Doran6" the court explicitly
stated that the Florida Sunshine Law "contains no exceptions."' 4 The
same judicial attitude is reflected in City of Miami Beach v. Berns.6 5
The city council customarily had held executive sessions excluding
the press and public for the "discussion of condemnation matters,
personnel matters, pending litigation or any other matter relating to
city government."6 The court declared that these sessions clearly come
within the scope of the open meeting safeguard "and unless the legis-
lature amends [the Sunshine Law], it should be construed as contain-
ing no exceptions."8 6
7
In Times Publishing Co. v. Williams-8 the Second District Court
of Appeal stated that the Sunshine Law has no exceptions "unless
there is a constitutional impediment to such a mandate."89 The su-
preme court apparently found an impediment in Bassett v. Braddock.70
Preliminary contract negotiations between representatives of a
school board and teachers were held exempt from the Sunshine Law.7 1
Although there is some question regarding the influence of constitu-
tional principle on the decision reached in the case,72 the court's
61. See, e.g., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, §§ 2(a)(l)-(3) (1970), which
provides express exceptions for deliberations to consider the appointment, employment
or dismissal of a public officer or employee, or to hear charges brought against a public
employee unless he requests a public hearing; deliberations relating to the acquisition of
real estate; and deliberations for matters affecting security.
62. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (1973).
63. 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969).
64. Id. at 700.
65. 245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971).
66. Id. at 40.
67. Id. at 41.
68. 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
69. Id. at 473.
70. 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972).
71. Id. at 426.
72. See 25 U. FLA. L. Rv. 603, 608 (1973), stating:
Even though the court seemingly based its decision on constitutional limita-
tions, it was primarily influenced by the broader policy arguments, as evidenced
by the court's emphasis on pragmatism and fairness.
The Bassett decision appeared to signal a retreat from the broad "foreseeable action"
test. Subsequent cases, however, have reaffirmed the test, see notes 26-31 and accompany-
ing text supra, and the Bassett view appears to be an aberration.
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language directly supports the finding of a specific constitutional ex-
ception at least in the absence of legislative action.73 The vitality of
this impediment to strict application of the law has been substantially
impaired by recent legislative action under the collective bargaining
provision in the constitution. 74
The only other constitutional issue raised as yet concerns an at-
torney's ethical obligations and discipline. In Times Publishing Co. v.
Williams75 the district court of appeal declared that the legislature was
impotent to regulate the conduct of attorneys, over which the supreme
court has exclusive jurisdiction.5 The court stated that the attorney
"cannot be put in the untenable position of choice between a viola-
tion of a statute or a violation of a specific Canon insofar as they clearly
conflict."77 Thus the legislature cannot require that an attorney's ad-
vice to a governmental agency regarding pending or contemplated
litigation be made public when, in his professional judgment, that
advice must remain confidential."8 The Code of Professional Responsi-
bility,79 promulgated since the Times decision, probably does not con-
flict with the Sunshine Law. Under the new Code, an attorney is re-
lieved of the duty of confidentiality when required by law to divulge
information."0 The Sunshine Law arguably incorporates this rule and,
therefore, a constitutional problem no longer exists.81
D. Enforcement
Criminal sanctions, injunctive relief and invalidation of illegal
Another commentator has suggested that the court avoided a direct holding on
the constitutional impediment issue by merely affirming the lower court. "It could
well be argued that the Court was with reservation 'judicially implementing' the
Constitutional collective bargaining provision in the absence of statutory guidance,
without regard to the means employed." 118 CONG. REc. S 12,803 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1972).
73. "Here we have a literal constitutional exception expressly provided within the
Sunshine Law. ... 262 So. 2d at 426.
74. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
75. 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
76. Id. at 474. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 23, "gives 'exclusive jurisdiction' to the Supreme
Court in the disciplining of attorneys." 222 So. 2d at 475.
77. 222 So. 2d at 475.
78. See id. at 475-76.
79. Adopted by order of the Florida Supreme Court on June 3, 1970, the Code
became effective October 1, 1970. See In re The Integration Rule of the Florida Bar,
235 So. 2d 723, 726 (Fla. 1970).
80. FLA. CODE OF PROF. REsp. DR 4-10(D) provides in part:
A lawyer shall reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets when required by law, provided that a lawyer required
by a tribunal to make such a disclosure may first avail himself of all appellate
remedies available to him.
81. See 1973 FLA. Arr'Y GEN. OP. 073-56.
1974]
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action are available to discourage violation of the Sunshine Law. 2 In
addition, each citizen of Florida has standing to enforce the law.s
(1) Criminal Sanctions
Any member of an agency subject to the Sunshine Law who at-
tends a meeting in violation of the law is guilty of a second degree
misdemeanor punishable by 60 days in jail,8 4 a 500-dollar fine,85 or
both.8 6 The supreme court has construed the law "to impliedly re-
quire a charge and proof of scienter."87 While the inadvertent violator
can therefore escape penal sanctions, injunctive relief and invalidation
are still available.
Although prosecution under this section is difficult even without
this judicial limitation, 8 convictions have been obtained.8 9 There is
little evidence that prosecutors are reluctant to enforce a law popular
with the public and press.90
(2) Injunctive Relief
Injunctive relief has been characterized by one court as "an extra-
ordinary remedy which issues only when justice requires and there is
not adequate remedy at law, and when there is a real and imminent
82. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (1973).
83. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(2) (1973).
84. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(5)(b) (1973).
85. FLA. STAT. § 775.083(4) (1973).
86. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(3) (1973).
87. Board of Pub. Instr. v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693, 699 (Fla. 1969).
88. One commentator, discussing the criminal penalties under the Texas open
meeting statute, TEx. Ray. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (1970), is skeptical about the
practicality of prosecuting intentional violations:
Nevertheless, even these violations may remain unchecked by the Act's criminal
provisions. First, enforcement of the Act hinges upon the prosecutorial zeal of
politically sensitive county and district attorneys, who are apt to be cautious
in proceeding against often influential members of governing bodies. Secondly,
intentional violations will be difficult to prove, particularly when the only
available evidence is the failure to post notice. Thirdly, even if prosecution is
successful, the relatively slight financial penalty is unlikely to loom as a massive
deterrent force.
49 TEx. L. REV. 764, 773 (1971).
89. For example, the Mayor and Vice Mayor of North Lauderdale were convicted
on May 5, 1971, of holding "secret" meetings in the back of a town police cruiser.
118 CONG. REC. S 12,803 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1972). Similarly, as a result of newspaper
publicity, "[t]he city commissioners of Stuart, Florida were indicted and suspended
by Governor Kirk for holding secret meetings for which they kept no minutes while
they parceled out bonuses to two city employees." Id. at 12,801.
90. Conscientious reporting of violations by the press arguably puts pressure on
prosecutors to enforce the criminal penalties. Three of the first four cases seeking access
to closed meetings were brought by newsmen. See Note, supra note 8, at 374.
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danger of irreparable injury."9' The injunction is an excellent tool
for enforcement of the Sunshine Law, since inadvertent violations
may be remedied and future compliance simultaneously ensured
through contempt penalties. Its value, however, is limited considerably
when proof of prior violations is made a prerequisite to its issuance.9
Florida courts do not require proof of a prior violation when
seeking an injunction based upon a violation of the Sunshine Law.
In Times Publishing Co. v. Williams93 the court stated:
[A] violation of the statutory mandate constitutes an irreparable
public injury .... The effect of such a declaration in a subsequent
judicial proceeding, then, would be that one of the requisites for
a writ of injunction need not be proven, i.e., an irreparable in-
jury; and a mere showing that the statute has been or is clearly
about to be violated fully satisfies such requirement.9'
Proof of impending violations can be established in two ways: by
introducing evidence of prior violations or by introducing evidence
of intent to meet in executive session when such meeting is not
exempted from the statutes."
Because of the judicially created scienter requirement for criminal
sanctions, 6 injunctive relief appears to be the remedy most frequently
sought. In most cases injunctive relief will be readily obtainable when
a violation is proved, especially when a pattern of past illegal conduct
is demonstrable.91 Furthermore, since "[flew, if any, governmental
91. Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470, 476 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1969).
92. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 39, § 23c (Supp. 1970).
93. 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
94. Id. at 476.
95. See 49 TEx. L. REv. 764, 774 (1971).
96. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
97. The supreme court stated in Board of Pub. Instr. v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693,
700 (Fla. 1969):
This Court may enjoin violations of a statute where one violation has been found
if it appears that the future violations bear some resemblance to the past violation
or that danger of violations in the future is to be anticipated from the course
of conduct in the past.
An injunction issued in that case after the following had been proved:
"For at least a year and a half there has been a pattern on the part of the
board of holding [closed] conferences on Wednesday afternoon in advance of
the [open] Thursday night meetings ...
.. T]here was no doubt that there was a pattern or policy of the board
that they would not discuss in open session litigation, real estate purchases, or
personal matters."
Id. at 696 (quoting from opinion of trial court).
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boards or agencies deliberately attempt to circumvent" the Sunshine
Law, 9" most violations will be inadvertent, making injunctive relief
the only practical remedy for preventing future violations."
(3) Invalidation
In Florida, invalidation of illegal action appears to be manda-
tory: "[N]o resolution, rule, regulation or formal action shall be con-
sidered binding except as taken or made at such meeting" open to
the public.100 In Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison,'10 however, the
supreme court refused to declare that it had no discretion to refuse
invalidation when a violation is proved. Instead, the court adopted
a New Jersey court's conclusion that mere absence of bad faith
ordinarily is not sufficient to refuse invalidation.
02
Although the Town of Palm Beach court reserved judgment on
mandatory invalidation, it expressly approved the invalidation of the
zoning ordinance by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. 10 8 That court
had refused to allow the subsequent formal approval of the ordinance
in public to remove the taint of previous secret meetings of an advisory
committee. Implicitly recognizing the impracticality of invalidating
only the secret deliberations which precede formal action, the court
invalidated the entire ordinance since the action of the advisory com-
mittee "was an indispensible requisite to and integral part of the
'official acts' or 'formal action' of the Town Council."''1 Thus any
action taken by a public body which incorporates deliberations made
in a prior prohibited closed session may be invalidated.
II. PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING FLORIDA'S
GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE LAW
Valid criticisms have been raised concerning several aspects of
98. Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla. 1974).
99. Cf. note 87 and accompanying text supra.
100. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (1973).
101. 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974).
102. Id. at 478, quoting from Wolf v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 192 A.2d 305, 308-09
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1963), as follows:
"We need not now decide that no discretion is ever to be reserved to the court
to save the validity of official action taken in contravention of the statute....
It suffices here to say that mere absence of bad faith or other impropriety on
the part of the public body should not ordinarily move the court to stay its
hand in voiding [illegal action]."
103. 296 So. 2d at 478.
104. IDS Properties, Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 279 So. 2d 353, 356 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla.
1974).
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Florida's open meeting statute.'" An initial infirmity in the statute
is the conspicuous omission of a uniform notice provision; 06 unan-
nounced meetings usually will not be attended. Another weakness
in the statute is the lack of beneficial exceptions to the open meeting
requirement. 10 7 The scope of the Sunshine Law can be modified in
certain specifically delineated circumstances without sacrificing the
public's right to know.
A. Notice Provisions
In order to attend and participate in the open session, the public
and press certainly need advance notice of the time and location of a
pending meeting. The potential for evasion of the law created by
the failure to include a notice requirement is manifest. For example,
notice may be posted in a place not reasonably accessible to the press
and public 0 8
Although Florida's statute contains no notice requirements, the
attorney general has opined that notice of an official meeting must be
provided when deliberations concerning official matters are to take
place. 09 Written notice of a regular meeting should be provided prior
to the meeting to ensure that the public has a reasonable opportunity
to become aware of it. Texas, for example, has established a three-day
notice requirement." 0 Additionally, the notice should specify the
date, place and, whenever possible, the subject matter of each meet-
ing.111
In Shaughnessy v. Metropolitan Dade County" 2 the Third District
Court of Appeal did not require that duplicate notice be given when
a zoning board continued its meeting at a later date and completed
deliberations at that time. Lack of notice of the second meeting, at
which important official action was to be taken, seems clearly at odds
with the objectives of the Sunshine Law. In view of Shaughnessy, the
legislature should act to correct the situation. If a meeting is continued,
written notice of the later meeting should be required.
It is not unrealistic for courts to imply notice requirements, ab-
sent a statutory provision, especially when a governmental body meets
105. See, e.g., Wickham, Let the Sun Shine In!, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 480, 491 (1973);
Note, supra note 8, at 371.
106. Note, supra note 8, at 373.
107. Id. at 371-73.
108. See 49 TEx. L. REV. 764, 771 (1971).
109. See 1971 FLA. ATr'Y GEN. Op. 071-159.
110. See TEx. REy. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 3A (1970).
111. See 49 Tax. L. REV. 764, 770 (1971).
112. 238 So. 2d 466, 468 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
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regularly at the same time and place. Often, however, emergency ses-
sions are needed. In such situations special statutory guidance yields
a more standardized result.113 The guiding principle should be, "The
shorter the time period between notices and meeting, the more ex-
tensive and more accurately placed must be the notice." 114 Pennsyl-
vania requires twenty-four hours' notice for special meetings. 115 An-
other approach might be to require that brief, perhaps two hour,
notice of special meetings or emergency sessions be given to the press.
After the emergency session another meeting could be held, with the
usual notice, to re-evaluate the emergency actions. Regardless of the
method adopted, the legislature should act to prevent case-by-case
evaluation of the adequacy of notice.
B. Exceptions
It is important to recognize that the right of public access to
governmental decision-making is not absolute." 6 A balance must be
struck between the public's right to know and the interests served by
maintaining secrecy in certain situations. The approach to this
balancing process, however, should be "not how much can be legiti-
mately withheld, but rather how little must necessarily be with-
held."" 7 The judicial attitude toward exceptions to the Sunshine
Law is clear; 11a consequently, the legislature must act to provide any
necessary exceptions. In each of the following suggested exceptions
the scales should tip in favor of secrecy, but a secrecy that does not do
violence to the broad scope of the law.
(1) Quasi-Judicial Hearings and Deliberations
In Canney v. Board of Public Instruction'9 the supreme court
held that although a school board performs quasi-judicial functions
in conducting disciplinary hearings, it is nevertheless part of the legis-
lative branch and therefore subject to the Sunshine Law.12 0 The court
made it clear that any exception for quasi-judicial deliberations must
be established by the legislature.''
113. See Comment, supra note 9, at 1661.
114. Id.
115. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 253(B) (1959).
116. See Wickham, supra note 105, at 481; Yankwich, Legal Implications of, and
Barriers to, the Right To Know, 40 MARQ. L. REV. 3, 32 (1956).
117. Rogers, The Right To Know Government Business From the Viewpoint of the
Government Official, 40 MARQ. L. REv. 83, 85 (1956).
118. See notes 62-67 and accompanying text supra.
119. 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973).
120. Id. at 263.
121. The court stated:
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In order to ensure due process of law and independence of pro-
ceedings judicial in nature, an express exception to the Sunshine Law
in this area is warranted. As Justice Dekle stated in his dissent from
Canney: "The regular activities of an agency and those which are
quasi-judicial are altogether different.''122 Accordingly, exemption of
the latter activities from the Sunshine Law can be justified without
altering the status of the former. If quasi-judicial functions are not
treated exactly as are corresponding judicial ones, a denial of due
process and equal protection of the law could result.1 2 3 A person in-
volved in a quasi-judicial hearing should be accorded all the benefits
of a judicial proceeding to assure fair deliberation on the issues.
Judicial tribunals traditionally have deliberated in camera, thus pre-
serving an environment of fairness and impartiality.124 Since agency
hearings concerning disciplinary matters are functionally identical
to judicial proceedings, those hearings should provide basic constitu-
tional protections and safeguards for the individuals involved. Further-
more, in order to facilitate fair and independent adjudication of in-
dividual rights, open and uninhibited discussion among members of
the deliberative body is essential. Such free discussions traditionally
have been considered essential to a just and fair adjudication of rights
by judges and juries. 2 5 If an administrative agency or board is de-
prived of the right to deliberate in camera the free flow of discussion
and exchange of ideas and differing viewpoints might be stifled, re-
sulting in less than full consideration of the rights of those involved.126
If the board or agency feels aggrieved, then the remedy lies in the halls of the
Legislature and not in efforts to circumvent the plain provisions of the statute
by devious ways in the hope that the judiciary will read some exception into
the law.
Id. at 264.
122. Id. at 264 (Dekle, J., dissenting).
123. See id. at 265.
124. One writer has described safeguards traditionally thought inherent in American
courts:
Courts are a part of government, the part of government involved in resolving
disputes. Corrupt courts may decide disputes in the same way that fights decide
disputes, but corrupt courts fail since they do not show fairness in government ....
Since courts are the major agency through which due process and the rule of
law is [sic] brought home to our citizens, courts are significant factors in the
development of a sense of fairness and fair play among them. Obviously this can
be developed only if the courts decide cases fairly, and in a way recognized by all
as being fair. However, justice and fairness are only part of the whole. The
climate must be such that the results, fair though they may be, will be generally
accepted over a period of time by the citizens of this country.
1 C. JOINER, CIVIL JUsMrlCE AND THE JURY 12-13 (1972) (emphasis added).
125. See 278 So. 2d at 265 (Dekle, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
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In further support of this exception, Justice Dekle noted that,
when discipline is at issue, "private deals" and "extraneous considera-
tions" against which the Sunshine Law is intended to guard are not
likely to occur."' If this is true, the public's right to know is satisfied
when the result of private deliberations is made public,12 without
concomitant harm to the open meeting concept.
On the other hand, the dividing line between regular and quasi-
judicial functions will not always be clear. Accordingly, a flexible ap-
proach to the exception process should be established. The legislature
should provide precise guidelines defining the scope of the exception
and require written public notice of the intent to hold an excepted
closed meeting. This would allow interested parties to challenge a
specific exemption prior to the session.
The California approach preserves the interests of both due
process and government in the sunshine. All administrative hearings
involving public employees are deemed confidential unless the in-
dividual charged requests that the session be open to the public. 12 9
Thus, those who stand to suffer from publicity of unfounded charges
have the option of insulating the proceedings from public scrutiny.
A similar approach is recommended for the Florida law in order to
prevent character assassination or unwarranted damage to an in-
dividual's reputation.
(2) Official Investigations
A similar argument can be made for an exception to the Sunshine
Law when an official investigation is undertaken. Initial stages of the
investigation may involve the gathering of mere hearsay on which
allegations have been based. 30 Protection of an individual's reputa-
tion and preservation of his due process rights should be paramount
to the public's right to know, at least at this stage of the proceeding.
Disclosure of investigative information, many times obtained in con-
fidence, could have adverse consequences for the government as well.
Future operations could be hampered by the loss of sources of infor-
mation, and suspects could be warned in advance of prosecution.' 3'
Moreover, the government could be held responsible for spreading
false charges or for violating the personal and property rights of em-
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See CAL. GOVT CODE § 54957 (West 1966).
130. See Wickham, supra note 105, at 485; Yankwich, supra note 116, at 88.
131. Yankwich, supra note 116, at 88-89.
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ployees or others by unauthorized disclosure of information.132 Again
it appears that little harm can come to the open meeting principle by
merely postponing public disclosure until preliminary findings are
substantiated. A full, written report of findings developed in these
sessions can be required if further action is taken. Only disclosure
of that information necessary to secure procedural safeguards should
be precluded. 138
(3) Public Land Negotiations
Meetings at which negotiations for public land acquisition are
discussed should not be held in public, since premature publicity
fosters the risk that informed speculators could inflate the price paid
by the governmental authority.34 Although the meeting should be
executive in nature, nothing precludes maintaining records of those
deliberations.'3 5 Full disclosure and even an independent audit could
later be made, thereby minimizing the hazard of public officials them-
selves becoming unjustly enriched by acting on secret information.13 6
Of course, the problem is not present at meetings in which the proper-
ty in question actually is acquired, and those meetings should be
open.1 3 7
C. Invalidation
In Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison"8s the supreme court reserved
judgment on whether invalidation is mandatory when a violation of
the Sunshine Law is proved. 13 9 Thus, action taken in mere technical
violation of the law may be allowed to stand. This approach has
been successful in other jurisdictions140 and provides a sensible means
of preserving the open meeting principle without sacrificing efficiency
in the administration of state and local government.
Town of Palm Beach exemplifies the harsh result of routinely in-
132. See Parks, The Open Meeting Principle: Applying the Right To Know Under
the Constitution, 26 Go. WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1957).
133. Id.
134. See Wickham, supra note 105, at 486; Note, supra note 8, at 370. Of course,
this argument assumes that those public officials with knowledge of the pending land
transactions will not themselves disseminate that information prematurely.
135. 49 TEx. L. REV. 764, 772 n.44 (1971).
136. See Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the Right To Know, 75
HAirt. L. REv. 1199, 1209 (1962); 49 Tax. L. REv. 764, 772 (1971).
137. Note, An Extension of the Public Meeting Principle, 46 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 207, 211
(1969).
138. 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974).
139. Id. at 478. See notes 101-104 and accompanying text supra.
140. See Note, supra note 136, at 1212-14.
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validating official action when a technical violation of the law has
occurred. 14 The citizens' committee which held illegal closed sessions
was not composed of experts and did not possess any special ex-
pertise:
"Much of what the Planning Committee did with the planner could
have been done by the Town Manager, or some of the Town's staff,
or the Planner could have sought out residents on its own initiative
for advice and assistance in preparing the plan.' '142
Realistically, it is unlikely that the zoning commission or the town
council relied heavily, if at all, on the suggestions of the citizens'
committee. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that each body
held a minimum of five days of public hearings prior to adoption of
the ordinance.43 It is difficult to justify invalidation when so much
opportunity for public input was available. Arguably, the public hear-
ings of the zoning commission presented the earliest practical op-
portunity for public input regarding the plan. It therefore appears
that the only significant justification for invalidation was the preser-
vation of the open meeting principle. It also appears, however, that
the principle of allowing public scrutiny prior to official action was
satisfied by the eleven days of open hearings.14
A balance should be struck between the potential harm to the
sunshine principle and the costs of requiring ritual re-enactment of
essentially valid local laws. The major cost is unnecessary disruption of
the orderly functioning of the government. Another, perhaps "hidden,"
cost arises if a disgruntled party is able to prompt invalidation of
official action merely because it was unfavorable to him; automatic
invalidation could transform the Sunshine Law into a weapon for
personal vengeance, with no actual relation to the goals of the open
meeting principle.
Because it can be addressed only on a case-by-case basis, the in-
validation issue does not seem readily adaptable to legislative action.
The burden, therefore, must fall on the judicial branch of govern-
141. See notes 46-49 and accompanying text supra, discussing the facts of the case.
142. 296 So. 2d at 479 (Dekle, J., dissenting) (quoting from opinion of trial
court).
143. See id. at 481.
144. See IDS Properties, Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 279 So. 2d 353, 360 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1973), aiJd sub nom. Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473
(Fla. 1974):
When the matter was fully and fairly publicly aired and voted upon at the public
meeting, the statutory requirement was satisfied, without regard to preliminary
discussion or deliberation held prior thereto.
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ment, and the courts should use their apparent power to stay in-
validation 14 5 in a manner that will prevent unnecessary disruption of
the governmental process.
III. CONCLUSION
Judicial willingness to support the spirit and intent of the Sunshine
Law is clear. There is good reason to believe, therefore, that legisla-
tive modifications intended to refine the law would receive the same
favorable treatment. This note has proposed several such alterations,
designed to limit the law in certain areas without sacrificing its purpose
or mitigating its impact. An overly rigid application of the Sunshine
Law can only damage its acceptability and, ultimately, create pressure
to circumscribe its broad reach.
SIDNEY L. MATrHEW
145. See note 102 and accompanying text supra.
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